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NOTES
Community Property- Deferred Compensation Plans-
Interest of Nonemployee Spouse at Divorce
James E. Herring began participating in two deferred compen-
sation plans during his marriage to defendant. One, a profit sharing
plan, was maintained entirely by contributions of Herring's em-
ployer, while the other, an annuity plan, was maintained by joint
contributions of Herring and his employer. Although both plans
were circumscribed by spendthrift provisions to the extent that he
had no presently assignable interest, Herring did have the right to
name death beneficiaries and to change the beneficiaries without their
consent. At the time of Herring's divorce from defendant, Ellen
Herring, the plans were fully vested.' Subsequent to the divorce
decree a receiver was appointed for the community property, but
no disposition was made of the plans prior to Herring's death. After
the divorce, Herring changed the death beneficiaries under both plans
from defendant to a trustee for the benefit of his children. Upon the
death of Herring, the trustee brought an action for a declaratory
judgment against the defendant-wife and the community receiver,
seeking a declaration that no part of the corpus of the plans was
community property as of the time of the divorce. Held: Under
appropriate facts, an employee's vested interest in deferred compen-
sation plans is community property and the employee's spouse is
entitled upon divorce to one-half of the value of the plans on the
date of divorce. Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965).
In recent years, primarily for tax reasons,' deferred compensation
In regard to vesting the court states:
[T]he profit-sharing account was fully vested in Herring at the time of the
divorce. The ownership of this account was unconditional. The contract simply
provided that when Herring should terminate his employment, whether
voluntarily or otherwise, he would be entitled to the full sum credited to his
profit-sharing account. The employee's vested interest in the plan has all the
attributes of property, and we hold that it was property at the time of the
divorce.
For the same reasons the annuity contract was also property at the time
of the divorce. Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex. 1965).
'Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 401-404 and 501, if a deferred compensation plan
"qualifies," the employer can deduct his contributions to the fund in the year in which
they are made, while the employee is not taxed in that year, but in a later year when he
actually receives distributions from the fund. Thus, the employer is allowed to deduct the
cost of providing a pension plan for the employee, while the employee is not taxed until
he receives the income after retirement. Generally, in years after retirement, income is
less and tax rates lower. It should also be noted that § 501 (a) also provides, as a part of
plans have grown at an astonishing rate. According to recent figures,
private pension plans contain over $ 5 0 billion in assets.' It is becoming
increasingly evident that in this age of the paternalistic corporation
the right to participate in such a plan may often be a family's most
important asset.4 Due to the gigantic size of these funds and their
relatively recent origin, they raise serious and unsettled questions in a
social as well as a legal context. The essential question is one of owner-
ship. Who really "owns" the assets of these new and grand economic
balloons? The trustee pilots them; but, by definition, he has no equita-
ble interest in the assets. Employers blow them up; but they generally
do not "own" them, because in order for the contributions to be
deductible in computing taxable net income the plans must be
maintained for the exclusive benefit of employees or their bene-
ficiaries, with safeguards against diversion. The beneficiaries ride in
them; but for various reasons they usually possess few incidents of
ownership.! "Thus, there exists a large and rapidly-growing body of
wealth which is owned by no one in particular, at least in terms of any
conventional notions of ownership or property rights."" To compound
the confusion, the law of Texas, and other community property
jurisdictions was, until now, quite undeveloped with respect to com-
munity rights in such plans. Prior to the present case, there existed
no Texas authority squarely meeting the problem of the status upon
divorce of so-called "unmatured interests" in such funds.
Before attempting to analyze the various situations which may
arise under deferred compensation plans in the field of community
property, a few definitions are called for. Under most of these plans,
three sets of rights may accrue to the employee. First, at some point
during his period of employment the employee usually acquires cer-
tain vested rights in the corpus of the fund. Although these rights
are generally circumscribed by spendthrift provisions, they are vested
and may not be lost by any act of the employer or trustee. These
the public policy to encourage retirement funds, that all income to the trust is exempt
from taxation. It is clear, even from this brief sketch, why such funds have increased at
a phenomenal rate in recent years.
aSEC Securities Act Release No. 1750, Dec. 31, 1961.
4 Johnson, Retirement Benefits as Community Property in Divorce Cases, 15 Baylor L.
Rev. 284 (1963).
5Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (1964).
6 Almost universally such plans are drawn by the employer, and, for ease of administra-
tion, as much control is reserved to the trustee as is consistent with "qualification" under
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401. For example, in the profit sharing plan involved in the
present case we find such provisions as: "Such allocations, credit and notification shall
not vest in any participant any right, title or interest in the trust, except at the time or
times, and upon the terms herein provided and shall not create any liability against the
company, subsidiaries, committee or trust except to the extent expressly provided."




rights are analogous to the policy rights under conventional life in-
surance policies such as the cash surrender value and the right to
borrow against the interest. Second, at retirement (or at other times,
according to terms of the individual plan) the employee will acquire
a right to specific pension payments, usually to be made at periodic
intervals. This feature is peculiar to pension and annuity plans, and
may be referred to as the income right. Third, the employee generally
has a right to designate a death beneficiary. This right is analogous
to the proceeds right under a life insurance policy. For convenience,
the various bundles of employee rights in compensation plans will be
denominated "policy rights," "income rights," and "proceeds rights."
Two theories have been advanced in support of the proposition that
deferred compensation plans, such as those involved in the present
case, should be deemed the separate property of the employee-spouse.
Both of them appear to be untenable. First is the proposition, stem-
ming from older cases,' that, "where the funds are wholly provided
by the company for the retirement plan, the courts have held that
such an undertaking is a charitable enterprise."' The legal inference
from this analysis is that there was a gift to the employee-spouse and
as a gift it is the separate property of the donee." The obvious answer
to this is that no matter how much discretion over the funds is re-
tained by the employer," it is the sine qua non of every such plan
that the rendition of services by the employee is a prerequisite to any
benefit under the plan. It has long been held that whatever benefits
arise as a direct consequence of one spouse's employment during
marriage are community property."2 This is the approach taken by
the court in the Herring case.
A second argument for considering such plans separate property
is based upon the fact that deferred compensation plans are generally
circumscribed by spendthrift clauses."8 Thus, in the court of civil
SE.g. Aston v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 241 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error
ref.; Webster v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 153 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
error ref.; Dowling v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 80 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error
ref.; Spiner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.
It should be noted that all of these cases deal with rights between employer and employee
and none of them involve problems of community property. See, generally, Annot., 42
A.L.R.2d 461 (1955).
'Blakeley v. Herring, 374 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). The supreme court,
in reversing this in the present case, specifically overrules the assertion quoted in the text.
'°Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 4613 (1960).
" If the plan is to "qualify" under the Internal Revenue Code total discretion cannot
be left in the employer. See notes 2 and 4 supra.
2 Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923); Kirkham v.
Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). Notice that this statement holds good
no matter what form of deferred compensation plan is involved.
"a One such clause involved in the present case reads:
None of the benefits, payments proceeds, or claims of any participant shall
[Vol. 19
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appeals opinion in the present case the argument was made that
because at the time of divorce the husband had no interest in the
funds that he could assign or otherwise dispose of under the plan,
the wife was excluded from any community share of the interest in
the plan accumulated by the husband. 4 This view amounts to an
assertion that, by an agreement between a husband and his employer,
the nature of compensation can be changed from community to
separate by merely delaying payment until after divorce. It is doubt-
ful that a Texas court would allow an employer to pay a husband's
wages into a spendthrift trust to the benefit of the husband and
thus deny the community any interest;" yet this is precisely the result
obtained when the employer pays money into a trust fund while the
employee-husband perfects his right to benefit in the fund by ren-
dering service to the employer.
Although no prior Texas case is directly in point, it may be helpful
to note three cases which may indicate the direction of future de-
velopment in the area. First, and most important, is the recent case
of Kirkham v. Kirkham,"0 in which it was held that at divorce a
wife was entitled to a share of the husband's "income rights" under
his Army pension. The pension had been earned over a twenty-two
and one-half year period of service, the closing twelve and one-half
years of which were spent during marriage. Upon divorce, the wife
was awarded a thirty per cent interest in the periodic income pay-
ment." As authority for its decision sustaining a money judgment
against the husband for the wife's share of future payments, the court
cited Berg v. Berg."8 In Berg, however, it is not clear whether the
court held that the wife had a community interest in the husband's
"income rights" under a railroad pension by reason of marriage
during the last one-sixth of the period during which the pension was
earned, or whether the court merely sustained an exercise of dis-
cretion by the trial court in providing support for the wife out of
be subject to any claim of any creditor of any participant and, in particular,
the same shall not be subject to attachment or garnishment or other legal
process by any legal creditor of any participant, nor shall any such participant
have any right to alienate, anticipate, commute, pledge, encumber or assign
any of the benefits or payments or proceeds which he may expect to receive,
contingently or otherwise, under this agreement. Blakeley v. Herring, 374
S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), rev'd, 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965).
14 Ibid.
15 The point is, of course, that the nature of the vested interest is determined, as a
matter of law, as of the moment it arises-i.e. it is either separate or community, and no
amount contracting should be allowed to negative the constitutional intention that certain
property interests should be community under certain fact situations. See note 26, infra.
16 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
17 Note, however, that in Kirkham the pension was vested and matured at the time of
the divorce.
18 115 S.W.2d 1171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.
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the husband's separate estate under "the right of a trial court to pro-
vide for the divorced wife's support out of the separate estate of the
former husband .. ,"' The third important case, Allen v. Allen,'
must be closely analyzed in order to determine what it does not hold,
for it is easy to misinterpret the opinion as authority for the proposi-
tion that a nonemployee spouse never has an interest in a deferred
compensation plan that has not yet matured. What the case does hold
is that under the provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act of 19372"
a spouse of an employee is barred from any interest in an unmatured
plan. It is pointed out that the case involves the effect of federal
exemptions, not private spendthrift provisions, and should be limited
to its special facts.22
Although the issue was not before the court in the present case,
it should be noted that in the only two Texas cases considering the
problem," the separate or community nature of "income rights" was
determined by applying the so-called "tracing principle" rather than
the rule of "inception-of-title."' Thus, in cases in which the interest
1Id. at 1172.
2' 363 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
21 50 Star. 309 (1937), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 228a-228z (1958). Section 228a (1),
quoted in Allen, reads: "Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, no annuity or pension payment shall be
assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process
under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated."
2a As to the effect that federal exemptions may have upon community and family rights
in pension plans, the Allen case appears to be in conflict with Dillard v. Dillard, 341 S.W.2d
668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e., which held that similar exceptions of benefits
paid by the Veteran's Administration were not exempt for purposes of child support pay-
ments. This conflict is discussed in Johnson, supra note 4, at 288. See generally Annot., 54
A.L.R.2d 1422 (1957).
'Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Berg v. Berg, 115
S.W.2d 1171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.
24 These terms were popularized (and possibly coined) by Prof. William 0. Huie. For a
recent discussion by Professor Huie of problems involved in Community ownership of life
insurance (to which a close analogy is drawn in the closing sections of this Note) see
Huie, Community Property and Life Insurance-Substantive Aspects-Developments in
Texas, in Texas Institutes, 2 Business and Family Planning 104 (1957).
The two theories may be defined as follows: (1) Under the "tracing rule," ownership
of property is classified as community or separate according to the nature of the considera-
tion given in exchange for it. For example, in the leading case of Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6,
(1851), the husband bought two slaves after marriage. One, Peter, was purchased entirely
with the husband's separate funds. The other, Finn, was bought with mixed funds, $330
separate and $470 community. It was held that Peter was separate property of the husband
and Finn was owned by "mixed title"-330/800ths separate and 470/800ths community.
The theory was that the characterization of property is not changed by a change in form.
(2) However, a problem often arises as to the point of time when property is to be
characterized, after which tracing establishes a right of reimbursement rather than part
ownership. For example, in Love, if the husband had taken title to Finn prior to marriage
but owing $470 on the purchase price, and then after marriage had paid the debt with
community funds it is almost certain that Finn would have remained separate property and
the community, instead of getting part ownership, would have had only a right to re-
imbursement. Under this set of facts we would see an example of "inception-of-title." See
the leading case of Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281 (1898). But cf. Sparks
v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 90 S.W. 485 (1906).
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was incepted prior to marriage, but perfected during the existence
of the community, the community was given part ownership of the
"income" in the proportion that community funds or services were
used to obtain the interest. Under the "inception of title" rule,
separate ownership would have been given to the employee-spouse in
the principal case if the plan had been entered into prior to marriage.
The community, however, would have had a right to reimbursement
for its contributions to the maintenance and perfection of the plan.
It is believed that the "tracing" rule is more just and more easily
applied,' and it is suggested that it should be extended to cover not
only "income rights" but also "policy rights.""6 It should be pointed
out that in the present case (a "policy rights" situation), no matter
which rule is applied, the entire interest should be community be-
cause title was incepted subsequent to marriage and all "payments"
were made either with community funds or by the exertion of com-
munity effort. The problem will become more accute when more cases
arise in this area.
Thus, the present case settles several basic problems. First, it is now
clear that spendthrift provisions in deferred compensation plans
do not affect the characterization of the property interest as separate
or community. This is entirely consistent with the long-standing
Texas rule that the character of property as separate or community
is fixed by operation of law upon certain facts7 rather than by the
present intention' or even the ante-nuptial contract" of the parties.
Second, it is now apparent that these plans will be analyzed realisti-
cally'e and that the idea that they amount to a gift by the employer
will be discarded. This is also consistent with prior but rather unsettled
25 Indeed, in a "income rights" situation where the main community asset is a matured
pension income it would be most difficult to frame a decree under the "inception-of-title"
rule. The asset is a periodic payment. It is simple to divide such a payment on a percentage
basis according to the percentage of property or services (community or separate) used to
mature the pension right. It is correspondingly difficult to attempt a schedule of reimburse-
ment to the nonbeneficiary spouse for his share of community property used to maintain
the separate pension plan during the years of marriage subsequent to the original inception
of title.
" For an example of the "tracing principle" at work in a life insurance "policy rights"
situation see Berdoll v. Berdoll, 145 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism. But cf.
McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref., noted in 18 Sw.
L.J. 521 (1964), a "proceeds" case, in which the inception-of-title rule was firmly adopted.
Although McCurdy can be distinguished as a "proceeds" case, one may speculate that the
rule will be extended to cover surrender value in "policy rights" situations. However, for
reasons stated above, and under the influence of Kirkham and Berg, it is believed that
"tracing" is, and will remain, the rule in "'income" situations.
21 Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
2 Cox v. Miller, 54 Tex. 16 (1880); Brokaw v. Collett, 1 S.W.2d 1090 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1928).
Goreman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
0 It is largely though the grace, not of the gift tax law, but of the income tax law,
that such plans exist at all. See note 1, supra.
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authority. " Third, Herring makes explicit the fact that a vested in-
terest in an unmatured, " deferred compensation plan is property for
purposes of Texas community property law.
In summary, four situations may be envisioned upon dissolution
of a community which holds interests in a deferred compensation
plan:
(1) First is the case of dissolution by divorce (or death of the
nonemployee spouse) where there is a present, matured "income
right." This is the Kirkham-Berg situation, and it may be asserted
with a relative amount of confidence that if the community existed
during part or all of the period of accrual then part or all of the
income is community property and is divisible as such at dissolution.
(2) Second, and slightly more difficult, is the situation in the
Herring case, in which the employee-spouse has an unmatured but
vested interest, capable of valuation but generally circumscribed by
spendthrift provisions, and unavailable to the employee except by
severance of employment short of maturity of the plan, i.e., the
"policy right" situation. It is believed that whether or not this in-
terest is community property should be determined by application of
tracing principles, the private spendthrift terms of the contract are
irrelevant in determining the community or separate nature of the
interest, and such an interest should be treated at dissolution as
analogous policy rights are treated under similar circumstances in-
volving life insurance-i.e. they should be divisible."
(3) Third is the case of dissolution by death of the employee
spouse, with proceeds going to a beneficiary designated in the con-
tract. Here it is submitted that the plan should be treated pre-
cisely as a life insurance policy under similar circumstances. Follow-
ing life insurance principles, the proceeds would clearly be property,"
but would be subject to gift by the employee-spouse to a third (non-
community) party by naming such party beneficiary under the pro-
visions of the plan." However, such a gift would always be subject
to attack as a fraud (or constructive fraud) upon the community




Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (1923).
s' An "unmatured" plan, as the term is understood in this note, refers to any deferred
compensation plan which is not perfected-i.e., one which must have some additional event
occur before it will begin pension payments or pay death benefits. Thus a plan may be
"unmatured" although vested. This was the situation in the present case.
33Cox v. Cox, 304 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
4 See Brown v. Lee, 371 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 133 (1964).
"o Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 145 Tex. 245, 197 S.W.2d 105 (1946);
Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624 (1901).
' Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953), on second appeal,
[Vol. 19
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(4) Last is the situation in which the employee-spouse has a certain
interest in the plan, but the interest remains unvested and is not
susceptible of valuation. Here it must be suggested that such inter-
est, although possibly contingently valuable and although obtained
through community means, is not property but rather a mere ex-
pectancy and as such not divisible at dissolution of the marriage."
In the first and second situations mentioned above an additional
difficulty is encountered in drafting an appropriate divorce decree.
This difficulty stems from the fact that although a major portion of
the community's economic worth is vested in a deferred compensa-
tion plan, it may be difficult to divide equitably the value and the
risks of the plan. These plans are so varied in their terms, each having
been drafted to meet a different set of circumstances, that it is im-
possbile to suggest any single rule or method of division that would
be equitable in every situation. To compound the difficulty, these
plans, unlike life insurance, generally have no immediate cash sur-
render value. It must be remembered that the formulation of the
decree must also depend upon such contingencies as the availability
of other assets, the overall economic situation of the community and
the existence of children. Because the facts in individual cases will
be quite diverse, Texas divorce courts must use wisely their extremely
broad discretionary powers in matters concerning division of property
at divorce." It is suggested that no hard and fast rule can or should
be laid down in this area, that each case be made to turn upon its
own equities, but that in general the value of the deferred compensa-
tion plan should be distributed by way of an in personam decree
against the husband, on which the wife could bring suit and become
a judgment creditor.
Michael Ramsey
220 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1955); Martin v. Moran, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 32 S.W. 904
(Tex. Civ. App. 1895). It should be kept firmly in mind that the present case is concerned
with "policy rights" at the time of divorce. The intervening death of the husband-beneficiary
should not be allowed to cloud the issue with irrelevant considerations of "proceeds rights."
"McBride v. McBride, 256 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
" For an example of such a decree in an analogous situation see Coleman v. Coleman,
348 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error dism., in which the interest of a divorced
wife in an endowment educational insurance policy for benefit of a minor child was fixed
as of the date of the divorce and, in the event of ultimate cancellation, one half of the
cash surrender value of the policy as of the date of the divorce would vest in the wife.
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